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The right to vote is the crown jewel of American liberties, and we will not
see its luster diminished.'
Former President Ronald Reagan
Well they passed a law in '64
To give those who ain't got a little more
But it only goes so far...
That's just the way it is
Some things will never change
2
Bruce Hornsby and the Range
The disenfranchisement of minorities in the 1990's, particularly
African-Americans,3 appears to be more than a matter of ancient
legal history. The failure of African-Americans to exercise their
right to vote and to elect African-American officials is well-docu-
* Professor of Law, Nova Law Center; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1981. I would like
to thank Ellie Simon, Louise McAlpin, Louis Battista and Leslie Decklebaum for their assis-
tance in preparing this article for publication.
1. Statement of Former President Ronald Reagan, while signing into law The Vot-
ing Rights Act Amendments, HR Rep No 3112, 18 Weekly Comp Pres Doc 846 (June 29,
1982) as quoted in Comment, Vote Dilution, Discriminatory Result, and Proportional Rep-
resentation: What is the Appropriate Remedy for a Violation of Section II of the Voting
Rights Act?, 32 UCLA L Rev 1203 n 1 (1985). This legislation is codified at 42 USC §§ 1971-
1975(e) (1982).,
2. Bruce Hornsby and The Range, "Some Things Never Change" (Zappa Music/
Bob-A-Lew Songs, 1986).
3. This article focuses primarily on African-Americans, although its theme and con-
clusions also apply to many other minority groups in the United States. Because of the
unique nature of the history of African-Americans in the United States, however,the com-
parisons between African-Americans and other minority groups are not identical.
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mented and remains disproportionately greater than that of the
counter-part majority.4 The causes of this failure to exercise voting
rights5 can be attributed to social, economic, political, and psycho-
logical impediments.' Yet, the genesis of the psychic and practical
alienation of the African-American community to voting in the
1990's can be traced to the misuse of legal rules and principles.
The legal history associated with the quest for voting equality
reveals an area of the law subject to persistent and malicious
abuse. This history is particularly noteworthy because discrimina-
tors have attempted to circumvent not only legislative and judicial
pronouncements, but the dictates of the Constitution, specifically
the Fifteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Ironically, one of the first and foremost impediments to the vot-
ing rights of African-Americans in the United States was the
United States Constitution. Pursuant to this otherwise revolution-
ary document, 7 non-Whites were relegated to an inferior status in
the new polity. This secondary status included a deprivation of
voting rights.
4. Paul Lewinson, Race, Class and Party, A History of Negro Suffrage and White
Politics in the South, 214-21 (Oxford University Press, 1932).
5. Such a failure, as expressed in terms of voter apathy, extends to all groups. As
one commentator has noted:
America's electoral participation rate, hitherto easily the lowest among free demo-
cratic countries, fell further-from 60.6 percent of the voting-age population in 1968
to 55.6 percent in 1972. Turnout in the South, which had climbed steadily from under
25 percent in 1948 to over half in 1968, dropped back to 45 percent. And turnout in
the North, which had fallen by about four percentage points in each presidential elec-
tion since 1960, fell again by that amount.
In the 1972 presidential election, President Richard M. Nixon scored a landslide vic-
tory over Senator George McGovern, accumulating more than 47 million votes to Mc-
Govern's 29 million. But 62 million American did not bother to vote at all, and Amer-
ican voter turnout dropped to 55.6 percent of the voting-age population (VAP). Only
38 percent of the electorate voted in 1974 congressional contests. No developed coun-
try has such a low rate of participation.
6. See Judy Garber, Martin E.P. Seligman, Human Helplessness: Theory and Ap-
plications (Academic Press 1980). The various articles in this book focus on different as-
pects of learned helplessness in humans.
7. The present U.S. Constitution was adopted in 1787 as our second Constitution.
The first Constitution was the Articles of Confederation, which was rejected because it did
not provide for strong central control over the economy. As a result, the states were strongly
divided by retaliatory taxation.
8. See Louis F. Claiborne, Black Men, Red Men, and the Constitution of 1787: A
Bicentennial Apology from a Middle Templar, 15 Hastings Const L Q 269 (1987-88). The
Framers' treatment of the Blacks and Indians demonstrated the common prejudice of the
time against non-White people, and the common idea that the Black and Red men were
'children of nature' or 'savages'." Claiborne, 15 Hastings Const L Q at 271.
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Institutionalized discrimination, however, did not begin nor end
with the Constitution. Powered by economic imperative, it contin-
ued full-force into the 1800's, largely in the form of slavery. The
abolition of slavery in 1865 and the adoption of the Fifteenth
Amendment did not extinguish voting rights discrimination.
Responding to the widespread and stubborn resistance to voting
rights equality, the United States Congress enacted the first of
many significant voting rights measures entitled the Voting Rights
Act of 1865. 9 This Act was intended to protect minorities from the
residual, but still powerful, opposition to voting equality.
While the Reconstruction era witnessed advancements in voting
rights suffrage for African-Americans and other minorities, the le-
gal rights remained "paper" rights due to a myriad of counter-
measures designed to restrict the exercise of the franchise. Dis-
criminatory techniques included the poll tax, the White primary,
and other measures intended to make the exercise of minority vot-
ing rights insuperable. One Supreme Court Justice, went so far as
to characterize these counter-measures as the "long and sorry his-
tory of resistance to the fifteenth amendment."'10
The 1865 Act, and the many lesser measures that followed, did
not achieve the goal of neutralizing voting rights inequities. In-
stead, voting rights discrimination persisted and flourished. Toler-
ance of the modest gains achieved by the 1865 Act after a century
of application eventually dissipated completely, leading to the pas-
sage of a new voting rights bill, the Voting Rights Act of 1965.11
This Act was considered to be one of the crowning achievements of
the 1950's civil rights movement, championed by Dr. Martin Lu-
ther King and the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People.
In response to the new voting act, the chameleon-like modes of
institutional discrimination simply went further underground. New
and clever methods of discrimination were created to neutralize
the impact of the Act. As a result, the Act was amended on several
occasions to plug loopholes that had negated its efficacy.2
Despite such amendments, voting rights discrimination marches
on, almost at a faster pace than efforts to eradicate it. Statistical
data supports a dismal prognostication. Of those Blacks eligible to
9. Voting Rights Act of 1865, 42 USC 1971 et seq.
10. City of Richmond v United States, 422 US 358, 379 (1975) (Brennan J.,
dissenting).
11. 42 USC § 1971 et seq (1986 & Supp 1992).
12. Id.
1993
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vote in recent years, only a small percentage has exercised this
right. 3 White voters during the same period went to the polls at a








White 99,761 70,204 70.7
Black 10,340 6,048 58.5
1968
Number Percent Percent




White 104,521 75.4 69.1
Black 10,935 66.2 57.6
1972
Number Percent Percent




White 121,243 73.4 64.5
Black 13,493 65.5 52.1
1976
Number Percent Percent




White 129,316 68.3 60.9
Black 14,927 58.5 48.7
1984
Number Percent Percent
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higher rate.14 This is true for voter registration as well. For exam-
ple, of those Blacks eligible to vote in eleven southern states from
1980 through 1986, 55.8% voted."' White voters during the same
time period voted at a rate of 71.9%.16
This article, argues that the institution of slavery, and suc-
ceeding years of pernicious and increasingly sophisticated practices
of discrimination, have created an inequality that laws such as the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 have been unable to eradicate. The arti-
cle further posits that achieving effective equality in the electoral
process will require much more than changes in the law. Impover-
1988
Number Percent Percent
of persons registered voted
(thousands)
Total, 18 years 178,098 66.6 57.4
and Over
White 152,848 67.9 59.1
Black 19,692 64.5 51.5
US Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No 440 "Voting and
Registration in the Election of November 1988," US Govt. Printing Office, Wash. D.C., 1989
at 2. Characteristics of the Voting-Age Population: November 1964 - 1988.
("US Census Bureau Report").
In a recent article, it was noted that:
Of the 116,000 black Broward residents of voting age, only 50,000 are eligible to vote
in Tuesday's presidential preference primary.
In 1988, black voter strength numbered almost 59,000 for the general election. But in
July 1991, 12,039 African-Americans were among the 97,674 people declared ineligible
or purged from registration rolls because they had not voted since the 1988 general
election, said Ed Phillips, chairman of the Broward Democratic Party's affirmative
action committee.




Voters Feb. 1992 Feb. 1988 Feb. 1984
White 528,527 562,726 512,070
Black 49,899 51,551 44,473
For General Election
Voters Oct. 1990 Oct. 1988 Oct. 1986 Oct. 1984
White 574,996 609,477 561,981 569,181
Black 54,813 58,906. 51,287 52,172
Sun-Sentinel, Sunday, March 8, 1992, at Section B.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Voter Registration in 11 Southern States, by race from 1980 to 1986, is outlined
below.
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ishment, caused by two centuries of voting rights discrimination,
has created a psychology of latent helplessness which prevents the
effective exercise of the franchise. This psychic disaffection can be
overcome through education, the persuasive power of inspirational
leaders, changes in socio-economic status, and other forms of
empowerment.
Although attempts to effectuate substantive change may be un-
productive, such efforts, on both legal and social science fronts,
should continue. Any abatement of vigilant opposition to the dis-
crimination merely serves to legitimize the historical norm. At a




White voting age pop. 7i.9








White voting age pop. 69.9
Black voting age pop. 60.8
US Census Bureau Report at 2 (cited in note 13).
See also the following statistics:




















minimum, the law should spearhead the drive for equality in con-
junction with far-reaching non-legal economic, psychological and
social measures.
This article is divided into six sections. Following this introduc-
tion, Section II presents the legal history of voting rights discrimi-
nation and traces the background of the major laws enacted to
countermand such discrimination. Section III focuses on the mod-
ern era of voting rights inequality, particularly the legislative, judi-
cial, and societal responses to the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Sec-
tion IV examines the psychological harm resulting from sustained
voting rights discrimination. Section V explores potential remedies
and different alternatives that may assist in overcoming both the
psychological and legal aspects of voting rights inequality. The ar-
ticle then concludes in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Pre-Civil War
The legal foundation for voting rights discrimination in this
country is the United States Constitution, one of the most cele-
brated and democratic of governmental charters.17 While this doc-
ument created a blueprint for our country's political organization
and governance that still flourishes today, it also legitimized and
institutionalized problems that have remained unresolved for
centuries.
Perhaps both the greatest weakness and strength of the Consti-
tution lies in the considerable compromise struck between various
interest groups. The panoply of conflicting interests included those
of a geographic character (north versus south), size (big state ver-
sus small state), and the marketplace (particularly owners"8 versus
those with less or no economic power, such as slaves19 and
17. The Articles of Confederation were proposed in 1777 and ratified in 1781. The
Articles had numerous defects and were effectively replaced by the Constitution in 1787. D.
Farber & S. Sherry, A History of the American Constitution (Wash Pub Co, 1990).
18. See George A. Levesque, Slavery in the Ideology and Politics of the Revolution-
ary Generation, 1750-1783, 30 Howard L J 759 (1987). The natural rights ideology "spoke at
great length about men being created equal, but it also laid great store in the right of prop-
erty, one of the three sacred and inalienable rights apothoesized by John Locke. . . . [I]n
the colonial ideology, the right of property was central. . . . Levesque, 30 Howard L J at
767.
19. One commentator noted that for Black Americans, the United States was not an
escape from oppression, but instead "was a literal journey from liberty to bondage." Walter
L. Gordon, III, War, Blacks and the United States Constitution, 30 Howard L J 775, 776
(1987). Mr. Gordon noted that prior to 1808, "the number of slaves increas[ed] from 198,000
1993
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women).2 Despite the flowery language of the Constitution, fash-
ioned by the Framers' Committee of Style,21 the altruistic mission
of the Founding Fathers appeared particularly inconsistent with
their actions towards minorities. One commentator explained the
difference in the following manner:
One reason Negroes benefitted less than other groups by the social move-
ment touched off by the American Revolution is encapsulated in the apho-
rism: 'politics is the art of the possible; reform the art of the desirable.'
Colonial leaders exempted chattel slavery from their critique of political
slavery because the movement for independence required such a
distinction.2
One clause in the Constitution exemplifies the expedient self- in-
terest underlying the Framers' intent relating to minorities. Article
1, § 2, Clause 3 does not focus directly on the right to vote. It un-
derscores the extent to which rights, including the right to vote,
were not intended to be dispersed equally. That section provides
for representation in the House of Representatives in accordance
with a democratic system of government.23 In determining who
chooses those representatives, the framers decided to recognize
only a limited group of people for selection purposes - only "free
persons. ' 24 Slaves25 and others were counted only as three-fifths of
in 1790 to 1,191,000 by 1810." Gordon, 30 Howard L J at 776. After 1808, approximately
250,000 Black Africans entered the United States. Id. Comparatively, in 1790 there were
60,000 free Black persons, and in 1860 there 488,000. Id at 777.
20. Minor v Happersett, 88 US (21 Wall) 162 (1874).
21. George A. Levesque, Slavery: The Ideology: Politics of the Revolutionary's Gen-
eration, 1750-1783, 30 Howard L J 759 (1987).
22. Levesque, 30 Howard L J at 760-67 (cited in note 18). "In the colonial ideology,
the right of property was central, and there was hardly a man in all the colonies who would
not have seen a serious problem in calling for an end to property in slaves without consent
or compensation." Id at 767.
23. That provision states:
[Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers,
which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including
those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three
fifths of all other Persons]. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years
after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subse-
quent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number
of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State
shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made,
the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight,
Rhode Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New York six, New
Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Car-
olina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.
US Const, Art I, § 2, cl 3.
24. Id.
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a person.2 It is not surprising then, that when actual voting rights
were disseminated, the holders of the franchise were effectively
"free, [W]hite and male.
27
Despite the rhetoric, African-Americans were not just unequal
under the Constitution, but without any voice at all in the repre-
sentation of the fledgling democratic government. This dichotomy
between the ideals and the reality of the new country was high-
lighted further by the fact that the slave trade was afforded ex-
plicit constitutional protection until 1808.28 Thus, the tenets of the
original United States Constitution carried conflicting messages.
One message was that of hope and promise for all,2 9 and another
message was that of preference. Some constituent groups would be
granted rights and privileges that would not be afforded to
others.3 0
In the century following the ratification of the Constitution, and
particularly the decades leading up to the Civil War, the use of the
Constitution and the laws to deny African-Americans their rights,
especially the right to vote as a free person, created an ever widen-
ing schism between the lofty ideals of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence and those of the Constitution.$1 As one commentator noted:
25. Id. Interestingly, some individuals, including James Madison, sought to view
slaves as "both property and person but not wholly either." Claiborne, 15 Hastings Const L
Q at 272 citing James Madison, The Federalist No. 54, (J. Cooke, ed, 1961).
26. US Const, Art I, § 2, cl 3. This provision, along with two other provisions in the
Constitution perpetuating slavery, Art I, § 8, cl 1, and Art IV, § 3, has tarnished our guiding
document. For example, the only black member of the United States Supreme Court,
Thurgood Marshall, has suggested that the Constitution actively tolerated slavery. See
Thurgood Marshall, The Constitution's Bicentennial: Commemorating. the Wrong Docu-
ment?, 40 Vand L Rev 1337 (1987). In some ways, the Constitution may even be viewed as
laying the foundation for the inevitability of the Civil War.
27. Claiborne, 15 Hastings Const L Q at 277 (cited in note 8).
28. The prohibition on interfering with the slave trade until 1808 was known as the
"Slave Trade Clause," and was located in Art 1, § 9, cl 1, of the Constitution. That clause
was introduced by John Rutledge and although originally based on a date of 1800, was ex-
tended by General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, also from South Carolina, to 1808. It was
believed that this provision was adopted because of the threat of many southern states to
remain independent of the Union if this clause was not added. Claiborne, 15 Hastings Const
L Q at 277 (cited in note 8).
29. Raymond T. Diamond, No Call to Glory: Thurgood Marshall's Thesis On the
Intent of a Pro-Slavery Constitution, 42 Vand L Rev 93, 96 (1989) quoting Justice
Thurgood Marshall in a speech before the San Francisco Patent and Trademark Law Asso-
ciation that was essentially reprinted in Marshall, 40 Vand L R at 1337 (cited in note 26).
30. One commentator suggests that the Framers of the Constitutional could have re-
sisted the legitimization of slavery in the Constitution. See Claiborne, 15 Hastings Const L
Q at 279 (cited in note 8).
31. In a famous passage, that document declared that "[w]e hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
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As a descendent of the group enslaved at the time the Constitution of the
United States was written, one can view with outrage and shock the pious
pronouncements of the persons who sat in the Constitutional Convention
and those who signed the Declaration of Independence. It is almost unbe-
lievable that they allowed this vicious system to continue while professing
individual liberties and the dignity of the human personality especially
when they invoked the blessing of almighty God to support their position.32
One injustice that stands alone among many was committed by
the United States Supreme Court in 1857 3 in Dred Scott v Sand-
ford.34 Dred Scott was a slave who had sued his owner for free-
dom. 35 He claimed that his temporary residence in a free state had
made him a free man under the Missouri Compromise of 1820, a
law enacted by Congress. 6 Despite its opportunity to be true to
the ideals of the Declaration of Independence, the Supreme Court,
through Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney, declared the Missouri
Compromise of 1820 unconstitutional.3 7
Taney concluded that Dred Scott remained the property of his
owner. 8 Taney wrote that Blacks:
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happi-
ness." The Declaration of Independence, 1 US 1776.
32. Emmett W. Bashful, The Bicentennial of the Constitution of the United States
From An African-American Perspective, 30 Howard L J 783, 787 (1987).
33. One commentator understated the significance of Dred Scott to the African-
American community when he stated, "[t]he Dred Scott case, decided by the Court in 1857,
was a reason for the ambivalence of the African-American as he considers the Constitution."
Bashful, 30 Howard L J at 785 (cited in note 32). That same commentator noted, however,
that "[i]t took the Civil War, the Emancipation Proclamation, and [T]hirteenth,
[F]ourteenth, and [F]ifteenth [A]mendments to the Constitution to correct the legal effects
of this decision." Id at 786.
34. 60 US (19 How) 393 (1856).
35. Dred Scott, 60 US at 394.
36. See Missouri Compromise of 1820, 3 Stat 545 (1820).
37. The Court stated:
... the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Consti-
tution. The right to traffic in it, like an ordinary article of merchandise and property,
was guaranteed to the citizens of the United States, in every State that might desire
it, for twenty years. And the Government in express terms is pledged to protect in it
all future time, if the slave escapes from his owner. This is done in plain words - too
plain to be misunderstood. And no word can be found in the Constitution which gives
Congress a greater power over slave property ...
Dred Scott, 60 US at 451-52.
38. The Court concluded that:
Upon these considerations, it is the opinion of the court that the act of Congress
which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning property of this kind in the terri-
tory of the United States north of the line therein mentioned, is not warranted by the
Constitution and is therefore void; and that neither Dred Scott himself, nor any of his
family, were made free by being carried into this territory; even if they had been
carried there by the owner, with the intention of becoming a permanent resident.
694
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[A]re not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word
'citizens' in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and
privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the
United States. 9
Taney's opinion went so far as to state that at the time of the
Constitution's inception, Blacks "had no rights which the [W]hite
man was bound to respect". "' Taney went on to add that Blacks
were "beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate
with the White race, either in social or political relations".4' These
bold statements by Taney characterized both the implicit and ex-
plicit status of Blacks in the United States prior to the Civil War.
Thus, it is not surprising that statesman Frederick Douglass, on
Independence Day in 1852 commented:
I say it with a sad sense of the disparity between us. I am not included
within the pale of this glorious anniversary. Your high independence only
reveals the immeasurable distance between us .... A rich inheritance of
justice, liberty, prosperity and independence, bequeath by your fathers, is
shared by you, not by me.4
2
B. Reconstruction
The reconstruction era witnessed revolutionary measures
adopted to unify a country torn apart by war. These measures in-
cluded both restrictions on various rights, such as the freedom of
speech,' and the creation of additional safeguards like the right to
move for habeas corpus in an expedited manner." These measures
were taken to ensure the equality of former slaves and to control
adverse reactions by citizens of the southern states.'5
These laws, however, did not change attitudes. The pervasive at-
Id at 452.
39. Id at 404.
40. Id at 407.
41. Id.
42. Philip Sheld Foner, The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 114 (Interna-
tional Publishers, 1950).
43. See Ex Parte McCardle, 74 US (7 Wall) 506 (1873), involving a challenge by a
southern newspaper editor to speech restricting in the Military Reconstruction Act.
44. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 US 506 where the Court stated that:
The first question necessarily is that of jurisdiction; for, if the Act of March 1868,
takes away the jurisdiction defined by the Act of February, 1867, it is useless, if not
improper, to enter into any discussion of other questions.
Ex parte McCardle, 74 US at 512.
45. See, for example, Ex Parte McCardle, 74 US at 506, involving a constitutional
challenge on freedom of speech grounds to the Military Reconstruction Act by the White
editor of the pro-confederate Vicksburg Times.
1993
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titude of discrimination was reflected in laws of defiance. For ex-
ample, the "Black Codes" were enacted in various southern
states." These codes were a backlash to the increased protection of
voting rights by Congress. To illustrate, in South Carolina the first
post-war convention adopted provisions which restricted voting
and the holding of office to only free White males.47 As one com-
mentator noted:
The majority of [W]hites never acquiesced in the sharing of political power
with [B]lacks, and a violent opposition to [Bilack enfranchisement devel-
oped. The Klu Klux Klan became widely active ... and political intimida-
tion, including assassination, was common place.
4 8
Resistance to voting equality was both widespread and effective.
The imposition of literacy tests, for example, denied the majority
of Blacks the right to vote. For example, two-thirds of all Blacks
eligible to vote were illiterate as compared to only one-fourth of
similarly situated southern White voters.4' Thus, the effect of such
literacy tests was to greatly diminish the number of Black voters.
The attempt to disenfranchise the former slaves picked up steam
in the 1890's.50 The source of such rekindled disaffection was the
concern that the minorities would encourage corruption, and thus
divide the White vote to gain political power. 51
While many of the Southern states wanted the complete disen-
franchisement of Blacks, 52 this goal was frustrated by an equal de-
sire to permit poor Whites to vote as well. Because 397,000 Blacks
were property owners by 1900 with homes of their own, it was be-
coming more and more difficult to draw an exclusionary rule that
was not either over-or under-inclusive.5
Many of the Whites did not attempt to hide their intent to dis-
criminate. United States Senator Carver Glass from Virginia, for
46. See Laughlin McDonald, An Aristocracy of Voters: The Disenfranchisement of
Blacks in South Carolina, 37 SC L Rev 557, 558 (1986).
47. McDonald, 37 SC L Rev at 558.
48. Id at 560 quoted in Note, Getting Around the Voting Rights Act: The Supreme
Court Sets the Limits of Racial Voting Discrimination in the South, 10 BC Third World L
J 381, 383 (1990).
49. Note, 10 BC Third World L J at 383; see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
US 301, 311 (1966). "The disenfranchisement of [s]outhern [B]lacks was far from tempo-
rary; there was little, if any, improvement in the decade that followed. As in the early
1960's, only 6.7 percent [BIlack Mississippians were registered to vote." Note, 10 BC Third
World L J at 383 (citations omitted).
50. Lewinson, Race, Class and Party at 79 (cited in note 4).
51. Id.
52. Id at 83.
53. Id.
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example, stated:
By fraud, no; by discrimination, yes. But it will be discrimination within the
letter of the law ...discrimination! Why, that is precisely what we pro-
pose; that, exactly, is what this [Virginia] convention was elected for - to
discriminate to the very extremity of permissible action under the limita-
tions of the Federal Constitution, with a view to the elimination of every
Negro voter who can be gotten rid of, legally, without materially impairing
the numerical strength of the White electorate ...It is a fine discrimina-
tion, indeed, that we have practiced in the fabrication of this plan.
4
According to some commentators, the discrimination was not
even based on political underpinnings. 55 Rather, it was attributable
to what one commentator called the "Southerner's fear of 'social
equality'.""6 This commentator suggested:
[H. G. Wells] wrote of a Southerner who told how a White man married a
White girl and begot coal black offspring: this story about the results of
intermarriage was used, not as an argument against intermarriage, but as an
argument against the extension of quite rudimentary civilities in man of
color. 'If you eat with them, you've got to marry them,' he said. An entirely
post-prandial responsibility. Similarly, if you let them vote, you've got to let
them marry your daughters.
57
This kind of incitement occurred in many different Southern
states. Amendments to state constitutions denied Blacks the right
to vote. 8 Ironically, to avoid controversy or opposition, many of
the amendments were adopted by proclamation and not by popu-
lar vote.59 The results of these efforts in the Southern states were
largely successful. The use of politics, class struggle, and irrational
fear worked to disenfranchise Blacks:
In the end, the desire to get rid of the Negro vote triumphed, drowning out
the cassandra-like warnings of those irregular politicians who opposed the
new Constitutions. Race feeling had always run high among the poor
54. Virginia Debates 1901-02 Vol 2 (2972-73) Mr. Thomas, and 3076-77 (Honorable
Carter Glass) respectively as quoted in Lewinson, Race, Class and-Party at 86 (cited in note
4).
55. See, for example, Levinson, Race, Class, and Party at 87 (cited in note 4).
56. Id.
57. Id quoting H.G. Wells, Future in America at 270.
58. Id.
59. Lewinson, Race, Class and Party at 96 (cited in note 4) quoting Morton, Natchez
Daily Democrat (newspaper). Lewinson stated that "the regular organization of Virginia had
good reason to fear rejection of the disenfranchising code. When the convention code was
submitted in 1900, the 32 counties west of the Blue Ridge-the strong hold of White Repub-
licanism and Agrarian independence-were all but southern against the holding of the con-
vention. The people must therefore have gone for a convention in the counties which have
the larger Negro population ..." Lewinson, Race, Class and Party at 263 n 57.
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Whites. After the war, hatred based on social and economic rivalry in-
creased rather than diminished.60
1. The Reconstruction Amendments
a. The Fourteenth Amendment
Upon the conclusion of the Civil War, the Constitution was
amended. The additions had a dramatic and far-reaching impact,
essentially "remaking" salient features of the document to repair
the damage to civil rights and liberties wreaked by institutional-
ized discrimination. 1 The'Amendments-the Thirteenth,6 2 Four-
teenth, 3 and Fifteenth Amendmentse 4-became known as the Re-
construction amendments. 5
These amendments were primarily and initially intended to pro-
tect the newly freed slaves.66 The Thirteenth Amendment, adopted
in 1865, prohibits slavery or "involuntary servitude . . 7 The
Fourteenth Amendment defines citizens as "all persons born or
60. Id at 96 quoting W.L. Flemming, Civil War and Reconstruction In Alabama at
767 (Columbia University, 1905), which stated that "poorest Whites felt that the Negro was
not only their social or also their economic enemy, and the protection of the owner, the
Blacks suffered more these people than ever before". Flemming, Civil War and Reconstruc-
tion in Alabama at 767.
61. Claiborne, 15 Hastings Const L Q at 291 (cited in note 8). The Framers of the
Constitution enjoyed a rare opportunity in 1787, which would not recur until the post-Civil
War Reconstruction, when the Constitution was in some respects remade. Id at 291.
62. The Thirteenth Amendment states:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction.
US Const, Amend XIII.
63. The Fourteenth Amendment states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
US Const, Amend XIV.
64. The Fifteenth Amendment states:
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.
US Const, Amend XV.
65. See, The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court at 711-12 (R. Hall, ed, Oxford
Univ Press, 1992).
66. See the Slaughter House Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) 36 (1873).
67. US Const, Amendment XIII, § 1.
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naturalized in the United States .. ."" The Fourteenth Amend-
ment also protects citizens of the United States from state actions
that abridged "the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States,"69 and protects persons from being deprived of
"life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within this jurisdiction the equal protection of the
law."'70 The Fifteenth Amendment protected against voting dis-
crimination based on "race, color, or . . .condition of servitude."'7 1
Significantly, the Fourteenth Amendment was not originally be-
lieved to affect the voting rights of minorities.7 2 In fact, the pas-
sage of the Fifteenth Amendment two years after the Fourteenth
Amendment appeared to clear up any doubt about the role of the
fourteenth amendment by specifically addressing the equality of
voting rights for minorities. 3 Over time, however, the fourteenth
amendment became an important vehicle for ensuring voting rights
equality.
7 4
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in
particular, served to ensure similar treatment of all with respect to
voting rights.75 It was utilized by the United States Supreme Court
to enforce the Court's conceptualization of political equal-
ity-namely "one person, one vote."7 6 In 1927, for example, the
Supreme Court held that a "[W]hite only" democratic primary in
the State of Texas violated the balance ensured by the clause.7 7 In
the seminal case of Baker v Carr 7a decided in 1962, the Supreme
Court held that the dilution of the right to vote through the misap-
portionment (or non-apportionment) of a state legislature was a
justiciable issue under the equal protection clause.79 This "anti-di-
68. US Const, Amend XIV, § 1.
69. US Const, Amend XIV, § 1.
70. US Const, Amend XIV, § 1.
71. US Const, Amendment XV.
72. Comment, The Inexorable Struggle to Achieve Political Equality: An Analysis of
the Past and Present Issues Concerning Voting Rights in America, 29 SLU L Rev 147, 161
(1984).
73. Comment, 29 SLU L Rev at 161.
74. Id.
75. The Equal Protection Clause states that, ... no state shall deprive any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the Laws." US Const, Amend XIV, § 1.
76. See Gray v Sanders, 372 US 368, 381 (1963). "The conception of political equality
from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth,
Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendment can mean only one thing-one person, one vote."
Gray, 372 US at 381.
77. Nixon v Herndon, 273 US 536, 541 (1927).
78. 369 US 186 (1962).
79. Baker, 369 US at 188.
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lution" principle was further developed in Reynolds v Sims,80 de-
cided in 1964.81 In Reynolds, the Court clarified its anti-dilution
stance by stating that "the overriding objective must be substan-
tial equality of population among the various districts." s2 The Su-
preme Court adopted a conceptual framework or "process whereby
election laws or practices, either singly or in concert, combine with
systematic block voting among an identifiable group to diminish
the voting strength of at least one other group''8 was constitution-
ally impermissible . 4 The dissenting Justices-Harlan, Stewart,
and Clark-argued that the Fourteenth Amendment did not sup-
port a principle of substantive justice such as the one implied by
the majority.
5
As a result of the adoption of an anti-dilution standard, how-
ever, multi-member districts (districts drawn to discriminate
against non-Whites), and at-large elections were all subject to chal-
lenge pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection
clause.8 The fact that such practices were subject to challenge,
however, did not mean that the challenges were successful. As one
commentator noted: "Although under increasing attack, at-large
voting remains common at the municipal, county, and state levels
80. 377 US 533 (1964).
81. Ironically, some commentators have viewed Reynolds as benefitting Whites and
not Blacks. See, James U. Blacksher and Larry T. Menefee, From Reynolds v. Simms to
City of Mobile v. Bolden: Have the White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth Amend-
ment? 34 Hastings L J 1 (1982).
The legislature in 1964 was tightly controlled by the thinly populated rural 'Black
Belt' county, many of which had majority [B]lack populations that effectively were
prevented from voting. . . . The conflict underlying the apportionment issue in
Reynolds v Simms, therefore, pitted the fast-growing [Wihite suburbs against a dwin-
dling [W]hite 'oligarchy' in the rural Black Belt counties.
Blacksher and Menefee, 34 Hastings L J at 1, 2.
82. Reynolds, 377 US at 579.
83. Laughlin McDonald, The Quiet Revolution of Minority Voting Rights, 42 Vand L
Rev 1249, 1257 at n 26 (1989) citing C. Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution at 4 (1984).
84. Reynolds, 377 US at 581.
85. Id at 590.
86. Such cases included Wright v Rockefeller, 376 US 52 (1964) (holding that plain-
tiffs claiming discrimination in the formulation of district lines must show that the district
was created based on a discriminatory intent, not simply discriminatory impact); Forston v
Dorsey, 379 US 433 (1965) (holding that a state may have both multi-member districts and
single representative districts); White v Regester, 412 US 755 (1973) (holding that some
multi-member districts, based on their formulation and the intent of those who created
them, were unconstitutional in violation of the equal protection clause); City of Mobile v
Bolden, 446 US 55 (1980) (holding that a discriminatory impact would not establish a claim
of improper voter dilution under the equal protection clause, rather discriminatory intent
would also have to be shown).
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throughout the United States. 8 7 The Court subsequently held
that multi-member districts88 and at-large voting plans did not au-
tomatically dilute the vote.89 Thus, the Court permitted these ap-
proaches despite aspects of substantive inequality. The forms of
allowable substantive inequality varied considerably. They in-
cluded specific seat elections,90 majority vote requirements, 1 dis-
criminatory annexations,92 and staggered terms.93
In 1980, the Supreme Court drew a new vision of the parameters
of substantive equality in City of Mobile v Bolden." The Court
held that at-large voting in the City of Mobile's elections did not
unconstitutionally compromise the one person-one vote principle.9 5
There was no majority rationale for this decision. Justice Stewart's
important plurality opinion, however, concluded that for unconsti-
tutional vote dilution to occur, a discriminatory intent must be
shown."
In 1982, the Supreme Cotirt reaffirmed the discriminatory intent
limitation in Rogers v Lodge.97 Ironically, the Supreme Court had
created a different standard of review for cases involving the dilu-
tion of a person's vote than for cases involving the failure of a state
to apportion its legislature. In the apportionment context, all that
is required is a discriminatory impact. In a vote dilution situation,
87. McDonald, 42 Vand L Rev at 1257 (cited in note 83). "In 1980 more than 60% of
cities elected some kind, or all of their counsel members at-large." Id at n 36.
88. In a multi-member district, all of the voters in that district elect more than one
representative. A multi-member district could comprise several counties or merely a single
county. See Whitcomb v Chavis, 403 US 124, 128 (1971) (involving one county). See also
Forston, 379 US at 435 (involving more than one county).
89. An at-large voting plan may be described as a particular type of multi-member
districting. All the voters within the particular jurisdiction vote for one or sometimes more
members of the particular political office, such as county commission. At-large voting plans
often vary considerably. See Blacksher and Menefee, 34 Hastings L J at 3 n 11 (cited in note
81).
90. See Rogers v Lodge, 458 US 613, 627 (1982) (indicating that "the requirement
that candidates run for specific seats ... enhances appellees lack of access because it pre-
vents a cohesive political group from concentrating on a single candidate").
91. See City of Port Arthor v United States, 459 US 159, 167 (1982) (indicating that
"[iln the context of racial bloc voting.., the [majority vote] rule would permanently fore-
close a Black candidate from being elected to an at-large seat").
92. City of Port Arthor, 459 US at 159.
93. See City of Rome v US, 446 US 156, 183-85 (1980) (indicating that "staggered
terms. ., have the effect of forcing head to head contests between Negroes and Whites and
depriving Negroes of the opportunity to elect a candidate by single-shot voting"). See also
McDonald, 42 Vand L Rev at 1256-57 (cited in note 83).
94. 446 US 55 (1980).
95. Bolden, 446 US at 80.
96. Id at 74.
97. 458 US 613 (1982).
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a discriminatory intent is required to show that the government
acted unconstitutionally." This disparity is as much attributable
to constitutional history as to logic. 99
Once the Supreme Court began using the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to resolve voting issues, it served to deflect power from the
Fifteenth Amendment. Instead of being the sole bastion of protec-
tion for minority voting rights, the Fifteenth Amendment soon be-
came a secondary alternative. Yet, the Fifteenth Amendment was
not omitted completely from. the voting rights calculus.
b. The Fifteenth Amendment
The Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
was adopted by Congress in 1868. That Amendment, ratified in
1870, states in pertinent part:
Section 1 .... right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude .... o
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appro-
priate legislation.
Ironically, the adoption of this Amendment, along with the other
reconstruction amendments, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments, 10 1 served to underscore the triumph of the Union
over the Constitution. These reconstruction amendments recreated
the country's approach to certain basic values, namely slavery and
equality. 102
The Fifteenth Amendment, on its face, was enacted to counter
the lack of institutionalized protection against voting discrimina-
tion. 0 3 At the time of its passage, there existed a lack of clarity
about whether the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment was intended to serve that function.'0 4 With the enact-
98. Rogers, 458 US at 622.
99. Id.
100. US Const, Amend XV.
101. These Amendments were also adopted after the Civil War.
102. Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment protected life, liberty and property for all per-
sons against deprivations without due process, and offered to all the guarantee of equal
protection of the law. In the Fourteenth Amendment can be seen as a "new, more promising
basis for justice and equality." Marshall, 40 Vand L Rev at 1340-41 (cited in note 26).
103. Comment, 29 SLU L R at 148 (cited in note 72).
104. Id citing Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533, 590 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Not all
agreed with Justice Harlan's approach, however. See William W. Van Alstyne, The Four-
teenth Amendment, 'The Right to Vote,' and the Understanding of the 39th Congress 1965
S Ct Rev 33 (1965).
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ment of the Fifteenth Amendment, it appeared that the Fifteenth
Amendment was to serve as the beacon for equality in suffrage.
The legislative history of the Fifteenth Amendment is revealing on
this point, both for what was included and what was not.
The House Judiciary Committee draft proposal in the 40th Con-
gress prohibited "discrimination that was based on race, color, or
previous condition of servitude."9105 This proposal passed in the
House by a 510-42 vote. 06 The Senate, instead of simply adopting
the same provision, attempted to expand the scope of prohibited
discrimination to include "race, color, nativity, property, educa-
tion, or religious belief."' 1 This addition was quite controversial
and the Senate ultimately retracted its proposal."0 8 Instead, the
Senate passed the proposal prohibiting discrimination based on
race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
0 9
Significantly, the Fifteenth Amendment, as enacted, does not
provide for an express right to vote. While this fundamental right
is implied in the Constitution according to the United States Su-
preme Court in Reynolds v Sims, among other cases, 1 0 the Fif-
teenth Amendment merely regulates the power of states and the
federal government in their dispensation of suffrage."' Thus, the
amendment itself, much like the United States Constitution before
it, was a diluted compromise that served as much to undermine
claims of absolute equality in voting as it did to ensure a disper-
sion of power from White male landowners to others.
Without a threshold affirmation of a constitutional right to vote,
the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment still invited different
forms of disenfranchisement. Instead of an absolute ban on Black
voters per se, states subsequently were forced to use more subtle,
but equally effective, methods of discrimination. These methods
105. Comment, 29 SLU L J at 148 (cited in note 72) citing Cong Globe 40th Cong, 3rd
Sess 638-39 (1869).
106. Comment, 29 SLU L J at 148 citing Alfred Avins, The Fifteenth Amendment
and Literacy Tests: The Original Intent, 18 Stan L Rev 808, 809 (1966) citing Cong Globe,
40th Cong, 3d Sess App 97 (1869).
107. Comment, 29 SLU L J at 149 citing Avins, 18 Stan L Rev at 814-16; see also Cong
Globe, 40th Cong, 3d Sess 1035 (1869).
108. Comment, 29 SLU L J at 149 citing Avins, 18 Stan L Rev at 816.
109. Comment, 29 SLU L J at 149 citing Avins, 18 Stan L Rev at 817.
110. See Harper v Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 US 663 (1966).
111. Thus, the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits the unequal dispensation of voting
rights based on race, color, or condition of servitude, but only after the franchise is be-
stowed by the state. The source of the right to vote, however, emanates from the democratic
nature of our constitutional framework. Reynolds, 377 US at 533. "Undoubtably, the right
of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society." Id at 561-62.
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eventually included literacy, property, or education qualification
tests as pre-conditions to the right to vote. 12
Unlike its neighbor, the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifteenth's
guarantee of voting equality was both more explicit and easier to
circumvent. As compared to the Fourteenth's broad strokes of
egalitarianism, the Fifteenth was not as well formed or sup-
ported.113 Instead, from the time of its enactment, the Fifteenth
Amendment was met with ambivalence and even outright rejec-
tion.1 14 It was claimed that the adoption of the Fifteenth
Amendment offered opponents of racial equality a locus for their
animosity, spurring racial hatred and political opposition rather
than coercing such hostility to dissipate or disappear.'
The porousness of the Fifteenth Amendment's protection could
not be blamed on poor drafting. Even some of the supporters of
the Fifteenth Amendment did not intend for it to eradicate all dis-
tinctions between Black and White voters."' Many people simply
were not ready for total substantive equality. Even Abraham Lin-
coln, for example, at one time held surprising views. In debating
Stephen Douglas, he stated:
I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of bringing about, in any way, the
social and political equality of the White and Black races; I am not, nor ever
have been, in favor of making voters or jurors of Negroes . . .17
Congress attempted to bolster the Union's new course with sev-
eral Reconstruction Acts, including the Voting Rights Act of
1865.11 s The new laws granted all people, Black or White, the right
to vote." 9 Yet, resistance to the voting rights of African-Americans
remained strong, particularly in the southern states. After Recon-
struction, southern Whites began a tedious but cruel reversal of
the intent of the Fifteenth Amendment, effectively negating the
112. Comment, 29 SLU L J at 149 (cited in note 72).
113. Emma C. Jordan, The Future of the Fifteenth Amendment, 28 Howard L J 541
(1985).
114. Jordan, 28 Howard L J at 541.
115. Jordan, 28 Howard L J at 543-44.
116. Jordan, 28 Howard L J at 547.
117. Jordan, 28 Howard L J at 547 n 28 citing from "Lincoln and Douglas Debates," at
364. Lincoln also said,
I am not . . . in favor of . .. qualifying them to hold office or intermarry with the
White people; and I will say in addition, that there is a physical difference between
the White and Black races.
Letter to Editor of New Salem Journal (1836) In Lincoln's Works, Vol I at 7, as mentioned
in Jordan, 28 Howard L J at 547 n 28.




significance of many new laws. Based on the "Mississippi Plan,"
which was a plan by White democrats to regain control over the
state legislatures through terror and violence, 120 southern states
enacted various obstacles to African-American voting rights. These
obstacles included literacy and comprehension tests, poll taxes,
and very strict registration deadlines. 2'
The southern states received help from other sources in their
plan to circumvent the prohibitions of the Fifteenth Amendment.
These sources included Congress and the federal courts. In 1894,
for example, the 53rd Congress repealed many of the statutes that
accorded voting rights to Blacks.122 The goal in executing such re-
peals was to let the states once again govern their own elections.
23
As the House Committee Report On Repeal of the Federal Elec-
tions Law stated, "'Let every trace of the Reconstruction measures
be wiped from the statute books, let the States of this great Union
understand that the elections are in their own hands.' 1124 The ef-
fect was to promote the rise of state-sponsored discrimination.
State control meant greater power for states' constituencies, many
of whom opposed the tenets of the Fifteenth Amendment. The net
result of such action was to permit and even encourage states to
continue their staunch opposition to affording equality in suffrage.
The Supreme Court also played a significant role in voting rights
discrimination by virtue of its failure to vigorously protect the vot-
ing rights of Blacks in the Reconstruction era and the 1900's. The
Supreme Court adopted a laissez-faire approach quite dissimilar to
its activist stance involving economic regulations, and permitted
the states to retain control over the qualifications of those who
would vote in state elections. For example, in Minor v Happer-
sett,125 the Supreme Court considered whether there existed a
right to vote for particular citizen groups. In rejecting this claim,
120. Laughlin McDonald, An Aristocracy of Voters: The Disfranchisement of Blacks
in South Carolina, 37 SC L Rev 557, 558.
121. Comment, Mississippi and the Voting Rights Act: 1965-1982, Miss L J 803, 831-
32 (1982).
122. See, for example, 28 Stat 36-37 Ch 25 (1894); see also, Benno C. Schmidt, Jr.
Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era. Part 3:
Black Disfranchisement from the KKK to the Grandfather Clause, 82 Colum L Rev 835,
841 (1982).
123. Schmidt, 82 Colum L Rev at 841.
124. Id at 841 n 18 quoting from Repeal of Federal Election Laws, HR Rep No 18,
53rd Cong, 1st Sess, 7-8 (1893). See also, Comment, 29 SLU L J at 147, 152 (cited in note
72).
125. 88 US 162 (the Constitution does not afford females the right to vote; the deter-
mination of who may vote is within the province of the states).
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the Court essentially relied on Art. 1, § 4 of the Constitution,
which states, "[T]he times, places, and manner of holding elections
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state
by the legislature thereof."' 26 In effect, the Court held that states
may determine who is qualified to vote, noting that the Constitu-
tion "does not confer the right of suffrage upon anyone."'127 Ironi-
cally, the fifteenth amendment apparently provided restraints only
if the right to vote had been previously conferred by the state; the
electorate was expected to take "the bitter with the sweet"' 28
granted in the first place.
The Supreme Court's posture of deference to state regulations
coincided with its position in other areas relating to equality. In
1890, for example, the Supreme Court decided the famous case of
Plessey v Ferguson,'" in which it held that "separate but equal"
accommodations for White and colored races complied with the
Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment. 130 In prac-
tice, this rule promoted a policy of benign neglect. The adoption of
such a policy in the voting rights sphere was particularly apparent
in the late 1800's through the early 1900's.' 13 In effect, from 1870
until 1915, the Supreme Court failed to uphold the Fifteenth
Amendment against considerable state activity circumventing it.
The Supreme Court occasionally deviated from this approach. In
1915, the Supreme Court acted inappositely, beginning with Guinn
v United"States.32 Guinn involved the constitutionality of a liter-
acy test required by an amendment to the Oklahoma Constitu-
tion.133 This amendment contained a "grandfather clause," permit-
126. US Const, Art I, § 4.
127. Minor, 88 US at 178.
128. See, for this principle, Arnett v Kennedy, 416 US 134 (1974) (concerning a ques-
tion of procedural due process).
129. 163 US 537 (1896).
130. Plessey, 163 US at 559. In his dissent, Justice Harlan stated that "the judgment
rendered this day will come in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by
this tribunal in the Dred Scott case." Id. Justice Harlan's prophecy rang true, and it was not
until 1954 in Brown v Board of Education, 347 US 483 (1954), that the Plessey wall of
segregation began to be dismantled.
131. Comment, 29 SLU L Rev at 153 (cited in note 72).
132. 238 US 347 (1915).
133. Guinn, 238 US at 357. The amendment to the Constitution of Oklahoma stated
in part:
No person shall be registered as an elector of this state or be allowed vote in any
election herein, unless he be able to read and write any section of the Constitution of
the State of Oklahoma; but no person was, on January 1, 1866, or at any time prior
thereto, entitled to vote under any form of government, or who at that time resided
in some foreign nation, and no lineal descendant of such person, shall be denied the
Vol. 31:685
African-American Voting Rights
ting those individuals who were allowed to vote at any time prior
to and including January 1, 1866, to be exempted from the literacy
test limitation.13 4 The amendment was a transparent attempt to
exclude illiterate Blacks from voting by requiring illiterate
Blacks-but not counterpart illiterate Whites who had voted prior
to 1866-to pass a literacy test before being permitted to vote.136
Prior to 1915, literacy tests, as a pre-condition to voting, were
not considered to violate the Fifteenth Amendment.3 6 The
Oklahoma amendment at issue in Guinn, however, contained an
exemption specifically designed to advantage Whites at the ex-
pense or to the detriment of similarly situated Blacks."'7 The
Court in Guinn concluded that the grandfather clause of the
Oklahoma Constitution violated the Fifteenth Amendment.1 38 The
Court stated:
[T]here seems no escape from the conclusion that to hold that there was
even [a] possibility for dispute on the subject would be but to. .. [create] a
standard of voting which, on its face, was in substance but a revitalization
of conditions which, when they prevailed in the past, have been destroyed
by the self-operative force of the [Fifteenth] Amendment. 1 '
Thus, in Guinn, as well as in similar cases such as Myers v Ander-
son1 40 and United States v Mosley,"" the Court drew a line be-
tween permissible and impermissible state discretion in suffrage.
Ironically, while the grandfather clause cases were called the
"first step in favor of liberty [for Blacks] the Supreme Court has
taken," '42 these decisions also provided an imprimatur for methods
of permissible discrimination.1 43 By inference, the grandfather
clause cases stood for the proposition that literacy tests which had
a de facto discriminatory impact on illiterate Blacks were accept-
able.' Such tests only became unacceptable when the law ex-
right to register and vote because of his inability to so read and write sections of such
Constitution.
Id.
134. Id at 360.
135. Id at 363.
136. Comment, 29 SLU L Rev at 153 (cited in note 72).
137. Guinn, 238 US at 364.
138. Id at 363.
139. Id at 363-64.
140. 238 US 368 (1915).
141. 238 US 383 (1915).
142. Schmidt, 82 Colum L Rev at 879 (cited in note 122) quoting Moorfield Story, a
Black leader in the early 1900's.
143. Id at 879-80.
144. Guinn, 238 US at 366.
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pressly delineated discrimination in a de jure or otherwise readily
patent manner."'
While the grandfather clause cases were a deviation from the
"narrow literalism""' of prior Supreme Court interpretations of
the- fifteenth amendment, the departure was short-lived. The re-
turn to judicial deference was apparent from the Court's decision
in Newberry v United States.47 In that case, the Court was asked
to interpret Article I, section 4, of the Constitution, which states in
pertinent part: "The times, places, and manner of holding elections
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state
by the legislature thereof ... " The Court was asked to decide
whether Congress had the power to regulate senatorial prima-
ries.1" 9 The Court decided that Congress did not have such a
power, relying on the word "election" to exclude primaries from
Congress' control.15 0 Instead of looking at the effective importance
of primaries to the ultimate outcome of an election, the Court con-
tinued its "hands-off" interpretivist approach. Thus, states were
given further encouragement to continue their massive resistance
to the dictates of the fifteenth amendment.
Most early twentieth century voting restrictions were designed
to limit Blacks in voting, including grandfather clauses and prop-
erty qualifications. In Mississippi, the percentage of Blacks eligible
to vote dropped from over 50% to about 5%.151 As of the 1960's,
only 6.7% of eligible Black Mississippians were registered to
vote.1
52
III. THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
OF 1965
Rosa Parks became the symbol and basis of the Montgomery bus
boycott in 1955 by refusing to give up her seat in the front of a
public bus.153 The resulting bus boycott, along with other forces,
145. Schmidt, 82 Colum L Rev at 903 (cited in note 122).
146. Comment, 29 SLU L Rev at 156. "The majority's interpretation was a return to
the narrow literalism that had guided the Court since 1870" referring to Newberry v United
States, 256 US 232 (1921). Comment, 29 SLU L Rev at 156 (cited in note 72).
147. 256 US 232 (1921).
148. US Const, Art I, § 4.
149. Newberry, 256 US at 247.
150. Id at 258.
151. See Comment, 52 Miss L J at 803 (cited in note 121).
152. Id.
153. Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years 1954-63 at 128-
29 (Simon & Shuster, 1988).
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jump-started a movement for equal civil rights led by a young min-
ister named Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and the N.A.A.C.P. The
growing unrest of African-Americans concerning unequal treat-
ment spilled out of Montgomery, across the South, and perhaps
more importantly, into Congress and the courts."" As Dr. King
himself noted, "I have had a little something to do with lawyers
since the 1955 Montgomery bus boycott. ' ' 155 In fact, one writer
called the civil rights movement of 1955 through 1968 the "first
revolution in history conducted, so to speak, on advice of
counsel."'"
Dr. King used the Constitution and the law as a rallying point.
On the evening of December 5, 1955, in the Holt Street Baptist
Church, Dr. King stated, "We are not wrong," because "if we are
wrong, the Supreme Court of this nation is wrong.1 57 If we are
wrong, the Constitution of the United States is wrong. 158 If we are
wrong, God almighty is wrong." '159
One of the crowning achievements of the civil rights movement
was the adoption of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which guaran-
teed equality in voting.160 Ironically, the Voting Rights Act would
have been superfluous had the Fifteenth Amendment served its in-
tended purpose. Unfortunately, the amendment had not. Even for-
mer Justice Brennan recognized this failure."" He characterized
the Voting Rights Act as a response to the "long and sorry history
of resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment." 6 '
The 1965 Act was not originally intended to generate sweeping
reform in voting rights. Instead, its initial and limited goal' was
to reverse the voting rights status of African-Americans in seven
states of the old confederacy-Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mis-
154. Branch, Parting the Waters at 129.
155. King, "Forward to W. Counselor, Deep in My Heart," at xxi (1966).
156. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Negro and the First Amendment at 124 (Ohio State Uni-
versity Press, 1965).
157. Speech by Martin Luther King, Jr. at the Holt Street Baptist Church, Montgom-
ery, Alabama, reprinted in Carson et al, eds, Eyes on the Prize: America's Civil Rights
Years - a Reader and Guide, 45 (Ohio State University Press, 1965).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. 42 USC § 1971 (1965).
161. City of Richmond v United States, 422 US 358, 379 (1975).
162. City of Richmond, 422 US at 379 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
163. See Abigail M. Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count? Affirmative Action and Minor-
ity Voting Rights at 3-4 (Harvard University Press, 1987). "The aim of the Voting Rights
Act-the single aim -was black enfranchisement in the South. Obstacles to registration
and voting, that is, were the sole concern of those who framed the statute." Id.
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sissippi, South Carolina, Virginia, and portions of North Caro-
lina.16 4 The Act suspended discriminatory literacy tests and other
measures that were used to deny Blacks the right to vote. 165 The
Act also tried to prevent future discriminatory practices by requir-
ing affected jurisdictions to clear all proposals initially through
federal officials before enacting any laws that might contain hidden
discriminatory provisions. 66
The narrow intention to overcome the systematic discriminatory
practices of the old South led to the passage of the 1965 Act and
eventually expanded to meet the demands of increasingly vocal mi-
norities. The Act became transformed, focusing on overcoming ex-
press obstacles to African-American voting and assuring "meaning-
ful" votes that had an equivalent worth to non-minority votes.6 7
Section 5 of the Act, in particular, provided Congress with an "un-
common exercise" of power to meet these changing demands. 168 As
one commentator noted, "it was a subtle but important change: the
shift from black ballots safe from deliberate efforts to dilute their
impact, on the one hand, to a right to a vote that fully counted, on
the other.""6 " The Voting Rights Act eventually came to stand for
equality in voting for African-Americans as well as other minorities
throughout the United States.1
7 0
The Act directly confronted state discretion over the voting pro-
cess. Jurisdictions which historically and systematically excluded
minorities from the voting process were now required to obtain ap-
proval for changes in voting practices from the district court sit-
ting in that jurisdiction. The court was required to issue a declara-
tory judgment stating that the change in the law "does not have
the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging
the right to vote on account of race or color.'
71
In some ways, the Act succeeded in eradicating much of the vot-
164. Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count? at 3.
165. Id at 2.
166. Elective Franchise, 42 USC § 1973b(a) (1982).
167. Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count? at 4. "By acting to avert such rearguard mea-
sures, by prohibiting the adoption of county-wide voting and other electoral procedures that
threatened to rob black ballots of their expected worth, the Court had implicitly enlarged
the definition of enfranchisement. Now there were 'meaningful' and 'meaningless'
votes-votes that 'counted' and those that did not." Id (cited in note 163).
168. See South Carolina v Katzenbach, 383 US 301, 334 (1966). See also, Note, 10 BC
Third World L J at 384 (cited in note 48).
169. Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count? at 4 (cited in note 163).
170. See, for example, League of United Latin American Citizens v Midland Inde-
pendent School District, 812 F2d 1494 (5th Cir 1987).
171. Note, 10 BC Third World L J at 385 (cited in note 48).
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ing rights discrimination of the earlier era. Before 1965, there were
fewer than 100 elected black officials in the seven "Old South"
states, and fewer than 200 black officials nationwide.'72 By 1987,
there were 2,908 black officials in those seven states, and 6,892 na-
tionwide." 3 Thus, the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
gave the Fifteenth Amendment some bite,"" so that Blacks and
other minorities could have effective access to the voting booth.
Yet, the pattern and practice of resistance to equality in voting
rights did not end with the adoption of the 1965 Act, nor with its
expanded embrace of all minorities. Instead, the type of resistance
simply changed and "went underground."' 5 Poll taxes and literacy
tests were replaced by new forms of covert discrimination. 7 1 Cities
changed their boundaries by annexing or enlarging areas to modify
the racial make-up of their populations. 77 These modifications
often were intended to dilute the strength of the minority vote. 7 s
Redistricting also occurred, sometimes with the intent of changing
the shape of voting districts, thereby reducing the power of the
minority vote.
179
Discriminatory measures worked in subtle ways. While many
more elected governmental officials were African-Americans, as of
1987 more than 80% of elected African-American officials held mu-
nicipal or county offices while only 23 were members of
Congress.ie°
Congress attempted to meet these new challenges by further for-
tifying the existing law. It amended and strengthened the 1965
172. Lewinson, Race, Class and Party at 199 (cited in note 4).
173. Joint Center for Political Studies, Black Elected Officials: A National Roster
(1988).
174. The advances, however, are in some ways illusory. Of those Black elected officials,
more than 80% held municipal or county offices. Only 23 served in Congress. See Joint
Center for Political Studies, Black Elected Officials: A National Roster, as quoted in Mc-
Donald, 42 Vand L Rev at 1252 n 9 (cited in note 83).
175. Note, 10 BC Third World L J at 386 (cited in note 48).
176. Id.
177. Id at 386-87.
178. Id at 387.
179. Howard Ball, The Perpetration of Racial Vote Dilution: An Examination of
Some Constraints on the Effective Administration of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, as
Amended in 1982, 28 Howard L J 433, 437 (1985). Challenges to the Voting Rights Act have
been rebuffed. See South Carolina v Katzenbach, 383 US 301 (1966) in which the state of
South Carolina challenged the constitutionality of the Act and specific provisions, including
the pre-clearing provision. The Supreme Court concluded that the Act was appropriate
under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. Katzenbach, 383 US at 326.
180. McDonald, 42 Vand L Rev at 1252 n 9 (cited in note 83) citing Joint Center for
Political Studies, Black Elected Officials: A National Roster (1988).
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Voting Rights Act at various times during the past several decades.
For example, in 1970, Congress extended and nationalized the ex-
clusion of literacy and other tests as a pre-requisite to voting.181 In
1982, Congress extended the pre-clearance requirement until the
year 2007,182 and extended the Act's scope of protection by prohib-
iting voting practices that "result" in discrimination on the basis of
race, color, or membership in a minority whose primary language is
other than English.1"'
These Congressional amendments responded to Supreme Court
opinions which permitted jurisdictions to continue to find ways to
circumvent voting rights equality. For example, the 1982 amend-
ment to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act can be seen as a reac-
tion to the 1980 Supreme Court decision in City of Mobile v
Bolden.84 In that case, a divided Court found that at-large elec-
tions held in Mobile were constitutionally permissible.18 5 The plu-
rality concluded that in order to find discrimination under the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, as well as the Voting
Rights Act, evidence of a discriminatory purpose must exist. 8 '
The discriminatory intent standard had been used in different
settings. For example, in Washington v Davis,'8 7 the Supreme
Court held that a showing of discrimination under the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required a discrimi-
- natory purpose. 188 The adoption of an "intent" standard in the
context of voting rights discrimination was indicative of the Su-
preme Court's overall treatment of the subject. This standard is
much more difficult to establish than a result-oriented approach to
discrimination because motivation must generally be proved cir-
cumstantially with statistics revealing a significant disparate
impact.18 9
Because the statistical impact is often the only evidence of dis-
181. 42 USC § 1973 (1982).
182. 42 USC § 1973.
183. 42 USC § 1973(a) (1982).
184. 446 US 55 (1980).
185. Bolden, 446 US at 60, 74.
186. Id.
187. 426 US 229 (1976).
188. Washington, 426 US 229, 240.
189. See Regents of California v Bakke, 438 US 265 (1978) (Powell, J.). Yet a discrim-
inatory purpose standard is considered more administrable because many factors may con-
tribute to a differential impact between races, not just discrimination. Furthermore, if a
result oriented standard is applied, many fear that society will become constrained by racial
proportionalities, which is inapposite to the merit based system upon which our country is
predicated.
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crimination, and the government often can claim its actions were
attributable to non-insidious motives, presenting a successful case
is difficult. After much debate, 190 Congress disagreed with the Su-
preme Court and adopted a result-oriented standard prohibiting
voting laws or practices "imposed or implied by any state or politi-
cal subject in a manner which results in denial or abridgment of
the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of
race or color. .. ."191 This standard now asks courts to apply a
multiple-factor approach to finding voting rights discrimination,
including:
[V]iolations based on proof of factors such as racially polarized voting, a
past history of official racial discrimination affecting the right to vote, the
absence of minority elected officials, and the use of voting mechanisms
which restrict the voting potential of minorities."'
This addition is not without irony. While a multiple-factor ap-
proach replaced the intent standard, the difference in its practical
190. Comment, Vote Dilution, Discriminatory Results, 32 UCLA L Rev at 1204-5
(cited in note 1).
191. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub L No 97-205, 96 Stat 131 Section 2
at 134 (1982), codified at 42 USC §§ 1971-1975(e).
192. Comment, 32 UCLA L Rev at 1205-06 (cited in note 1). Objective factors a court
may evaluate in a "totality of circumstances" analysis include:
(1) [t]he extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdi-
vision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to
vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process; (2) the extent to which
voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized; (3) the
extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election
districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting prac-
tices or procedures that may enhance that opportunity for discrimination against the
minority group; (4) if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of
the minority group have been denied access to that process; (5) the extent to which
members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of
discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their
ability to participate effectively in the political process; (6) whether political cam-
paigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; (7) the extent to
which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the
jurisdiction.
Additional factors that in some cases have had probative value as part of plaintiffs'
evidence to establish a violation are: [a] whether there is a significant lack of respon-
siveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of
the majority group. [b] whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivi-
sion's use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or
procedure is tenuous.
While these enumerated factors will often be the most relevant ones, in some cases
other factors will be indicative of the alleged dilution.
Major v Treen, 574 F Supp 325, 350 (ED La 1983), excerpted in Comment, 32 UCLA L Rev
at 1206 n 12.
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application remained to be seen. Moreover, the amendment to sec-
tion 2 could be interpreted as conflicting with the pre-clearance
requirements of section 5 of the same Act, particularly if courts
fashion a remedy independent of the offending local or state gov-
ernment, without giving that entity an opportunity to offer its own
remedial modification. 193
While the additions provided increased coverage and protection
of minority voting rights, the shallowness of the changes masked
the need for deeper, more substantive institutional modification. In
fact, some commentators suggest that the fecundity of advances in
civil rights in the 1960's and 70's contributed to an attitude of
"enough already":
The narrow focus of racial exclusion- that is, the belief that racial exclusion
is illegitimate only where the 'Whites Only' signs are explicit- coupled with
strong assumptions about equal opportunity, makes it difficult to move the
discussion of racism beyond the societal self-satisfaction engendered by the
appearance of neutral norms and formal inclusions.
1 94
In essence, the theory and the practice of seeking equality as a
normative goal diverged to the extent that narrowing the gap be-
came the ultimate success. 19 5 Gains even proved to be chimerical,
in that advances often appeared to instigate a reciprocal backlash.
Such a backlash appeared to occur in both the rhetoric and sub-
stance of Ronald Reagan's presidency, specifically the perceived re-
luctance of the Reagan administration to promote minority inter-
ests. According to one commentator, "most Blacks interpreted
Reagan's victories in 1980 and 1984 as 'damaging to their [Black]
political interests.' "196
This type of perception provided incentives to mobilize. A re-
verse backlash occurred, and "[B]lack registration and turnout has
increased .... "1197
The cyclical or dialectical nature of voting rights inequality con-
tinues to ebb and flow. The harms caused by the discrimination
can be measured in terms of the dearth of African-American
elected officials, and perhaps even more importantly, the lack of
193. For an incisive and well-developed discussion of these issues see Comment, 32
UCLA L Rev at 1203 (cited in note 1).
194. Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv L Rev 1331, 1384 (1988).
195. Lani Guinier, Keeping the Faith: Black Voters in the Post-Reagan Era, 24 Harv
CR-CL L Rev 393, 397 (1989).
196. Guinier, 24 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 393 quoting from T. Henderson, Jr., Black
Politics in American Presidential Elections in The New Black Politics 3 (1982).
.197. Guinier, 24 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 393 (cited in note 195).
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African-American officials elected to high office. An additional but
no less important dimension of the harms caused by voting rights
discrimination is psychological. This includes the effect of sus-
tained voting rights discrimination on the hopes, energy and atti-
tude of the African-American community regarding the efficacy
and sincerity of the democratic political system. The next section
of this article examines this salient but derivative psychological
impact.
IV. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF DISCRIMINATION
As the first part of this article showed, 198 the adoption of the
Fifteenth Amendment and various voting rights acts after the Civil
War did not terminate voting rights discrimination, but merely
changed its complexion. Discrimination became localized, more
clever, and more subtle. However, it remained invidious.
This article posits that the sustained deprivation of voting rights
inequality has taken a significant psychological toll on the African-
American community. Consequently, the battle for equality-in-fact
must be fought in the realm of psychology as much as in the courts
or Congress; eliminating the psychological harm is a necessary con-
comitant to eradicating further discrimination.
To better understand the psychological impact of sustained vot-
ing rights discrimination, it is first important to trace and explore
its social science foundation. Psychologists have long studied the
effects of psychological deprivations on human beings. A psycho-
logical, as compared to a biological, deprivation results from a "bi-
ologically adequate but psychologically restricted environment." ' 9
This restricted environment features a loss of hope influencing dif-
ferent outcomes.2 00 "When humans find themselves in a situation
in which outcomes are uncontrollable, this uncontrollability or
helplessness 201 is attributable to some cause. The specific causal at-
198. See notes 100-153 and accompanying text.
199. D.O. Webb (1958), as quoted in J. Langmeier and Z. Matejcek, Psychological
Deprivation in Childhood 13 (G.L. Mangan, ed, Halsted Press, 1975) (3d ed, English publi-
cation) (Langmeir and Matejeck, Psychological Deprivation).
200. Langmeier and Matejeck, Psychological Deprivation at 13.
201. Learned helplessness, it has been shown, becomes more chronic over time, is situ-
ational, can occur in groups as well as in individuals, and does not affect everyone equally.
Learned helplessness affects the sexes differently, and depends on socio-cultural differences.
Thus, even if sustained voting rights impoverishment creates a learned helplessness about
voting, it would require closer scrutiny to determine its impact on particular individuals.
Psychological deprivations may result from a loss of material goods, opportunities, privileges
or basic needs. Suraj Mal, Uday Jain, and K. S. Yadav, Effects of Prolonged Deprivation on
1993
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tributions determine the generality and [level] of helpless-
ness .. ."0' Two Czechoslovakian psychologists have character-
ized psychological deprivation in a way that coincides with the
African-American experience:
[the] ... inner end product of the prolonged impact of an impoverished
environment . . . reache[d] through the deprivating situations - in other
words, it is a psychological state resulting from continuing restricted inter-
action . . . with [the] physical and/or social environment.2 °0
African-Americans who have faced years of voting-related rejec-
tion are justified in enveloping themselves in a pessimism or even
aversion towards participating in the American system as an equal
partner. Given such a history, it becomes easy to identify that sys-
tem as "theirs," or one that belongs to "them. 2 0 " Learned help-
lessness, however, creates more than just a rejection of the prevail-
ing system which creates that helplessness.20  It has been shown to
Learned Helplessness, 130(2) J Soc Psychol 191, 192 (1990). Applying this finding to the
context of human rights, if individuals were deprived of [a right needs] such as the right to
vote for a significant length of time, a psychological manifestation can be expected to even-
tually occur. As J. Langmeier and Z. Matejcek have stated, "since we initially defined psy-
chological deprivation as inadequate satisfaction, of basic psychological needs to a marked
degree and for a long enough period of time. . . ." Langmeier and Matejeck, Psychological
Deprivation at 305 (cited in note 199). The psychological impact can vary, including depres-
sion or learned helplessness. Mal, Jain, and Yadav, Effects of Prolonged Deprivation, 130(2)
J Soc Psychol at 192:
This conjecture is derived from studies reporting that deprived subjects display a
sense of personal inadequacy, negative self-image, self-blame, pessimism, low achieve-
ment motivation, and the expectation of future incompetence compared with their
non-deprived counterpart...
(citations omitted).
Lyn Abramson, Judy Garber and Martin Seligman, Learned Helplessness in Humans: An
Attributional Analysis, in Judy Garber and Martin Seligman, eds, Human Helplessness
Theory and Application 3 (Academic Press, 1980) (Abramson, Garber and Seligman,
"Learned Helplessness in Humans"). The authors suggest that numerous studies have doc-
umented the existence of learned helplessness in humans, and that "learned helplessness
plays a part in a wide variety of human conditions, including child development, stomach
ulcers, depression, and death. Other investigators have argued that the learned helplessness
model is useful in examining intellectual achievement ... . crowding ..., victimization ...,
the coronary prone personality ...and aging. ... Abramson, Garber and Seligman,
Learned Helplessness in Humans at 4. The authors further state that learned helplessness
occurs in different areas, including the motivation, cognitive, and emotional planes. Id.
202. James P. Murphey and Gary G. Galbraith, Effects of Personal and Universal
Helplessness Upon Self-Esteem, 67 Psychol Rep 963, 963-64 (1990).
203. Langmeier and Matejcek, Psychological Deprivation at 13-14 (cited in note 199).
204. In this light, the mere offer to participate in the system through voting takes on a
characterization similar to asking Charlie Brown to kick the football just one more time.
205. Carol S. Dweck and Barbara G. Licht, Learned Helplessness and Intellectual
Achievement in Judy Garber and Martin Seligman, eds, Human Helplessness Theory and
Application 197, 198 (Academic Press, 1980) (Dweck and Licht, "Learned Helplessness").
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create performance deficits, which are reductions in performance
on a subsequent task.20 6 Extensive learned helplessness, such as
slavery and persistent discrimination, could even result in depres-
sion and a reduced expectation of success. 0 7 As authors Carol S.
Dweck and Barbara G. Licht note, "[i]n achievement situations,
then, helpless [persons would] be characterized by cognitions that
imply the inevitability or insurmountability of failure, whereas
mastery-oriented [persons] would be characterized by cognitions
that imply that their successes are replicable and their mistakes
rectifiable. ' 20 s Moreover, individuals with learned helplessness
often have reduced self-esteem which affects the way those persons
perceive how they can affect the political process. Several commen-
tators have noted that:
The first implication is that the universal versus personal helplessness dis-
tinction deduces a fourth deficit of human helplessness-low self-esteem. A
major determinant of attitudes toward the self is comparison with others
(Clark & Clark, 1939; Festinger, 1954; Morris & Gergen, 1970; Rosenberg,
1965). This analysis suggests that individuals who believe that desired out-
comes are not contingent on responses in their repertoire, but are contin-
gent on responses in the repertoires of relevant others, will show lower self-
esteem than will individuals who believe that desired outcomes are neither
contingent on acts in their own repertoire nor contingent on acts in the rep-
ertoire of relevant others. . .. 209
These phenomena could help explain the difficulty of the minority
community in exercising the right to vote in a cohesive, efficacious
manner.
21 0
206. Netta K. Dor-Shav and Mario Mikulincer, Learned Helplessness Causal Attribu-
tion, and Response Frustration, 117(1) J Gen Psychol 47 (1990): "Initial studies of learned
helplessness in humans found that exposure to unsolvable problems produced helplessness,
that is, an impairment in performance on a subsequent test task ...."
207. Bernard Weiner and Tchia Litman-Adizes, An Attributional, Expectancy- Value
Analysis of Learned Helplessness and Depression, in Judy Garber and Martin Seligman,
eds, Human Helplessness 35, 39 (Academic Press, 1980).
208. Dweck and Licht, Learned Helplessness at 198 (cited in note 205).
209. Abramson, Garber, and Seligman, Learned Helplessness at 16 (cited in note 201).
210. -The depression resulting from learned helplessness is sufficiently unique to re-
quire a special explanatory theory. This new type of depression has been linked to feelings
of hopelessness, and even to "hopelessness depression." This new theory reforms the theory
of helplessness depression, suggesting that hopelessness is a somewhat different phenome-
non than the helplessness normally associated with learned helplessness. Lyn Y. Abramson,
Lauren B. Alloy, and Gerald I. Metasky, Hopelessness Depression: A Theory-Based Sub-
type of Depression, 96 Psychol Rev 358, 360 (1989). Sustained voting rights discrimination,
therefore, could even have lead to an attitude of hopelessness and despair.
Duquesne Law Review
A. Racial Discrimination
It is widely accepted that racial discrimination"1 ' causes consid-
erable harm,212 including psychological scarring.213 One commenta-
tor stated:
In terms of simple health, it becomes clear that black people will never be
able to develop optimal psychological functioning and affirm their cultural
heritage and identity, as long as they are relating to the world through an
anti-African, anti-self cultural perspective. American society, which is Euro-
pean in perspective, is anti-African in that it devalues African cultural heri-
tage and perspectives and regards them as inferior to American cultural
perspectives.2 1'
A study of racism in Colonial times has concluded that "racism
[in this era] should not be considered as an individual trait or
'quirk,' but rather as the most visible sign of a more systemized
oppression."' 15 This "organized domination"216 provokes two re-
sponses: " [t]he radicalized group [first] tries to imitate the oppres-
sor. ... ."217 Yet, no matter how hard it tries, the group is con-
stantly reminded of its lack of success. This creates the second
response: feelings of helplessness and despair.21 8
The African-American community's lack of control or belief in
self-determination is a foreseeable consequence of systematic dis-
crimination; "[to people who live in continuously adverse circum-
stances, life does not appear to be subject to control through their
own efforts. Only through some outside intervention do events
seem to be alterable, and such intervention is a rare occurrence."21 9
211. The psychological harm to African-Americans caused by discrimination is per-
haps best witnessed through the lens of history. A behavioralist approach emphasizes the
role of experience in shaping a person's psyche. "In fact, a perspective is as essential to an
understanding of a people as a longitudinal developmental analysis is to the understanding
of individual[s] .. " T. Hillard, Political and Social Action in the Prevention of Psycho-
pathology of Blacks: A Mental Health Strategy for Oppressed People at 144 (University
Press of New England, 1981).
212. Brown v Bd of Education, 347 US 483 (1954) and the famous footnote 11, dealing
with the conclusion of psychological studies of the subject.
213. Joycelyn Landrum-Brown, Black Mental Health and Racial Oppression in Doro-
thy S. Ruiz, ed, Handbook of Mental Health and Mental Disorder Among Black Americans
113 (Greenwood Press, 1990) (Landrum-Brown, "Black Mental Health").
214. Landrum-Brown, Black Mental Health at 114.
215. Franz Fanon, (1967) as described in T. Hilliard, Political and Social Action at
146 (cited in note 211).
216. Id citing from Franz Fanon.
217. Id at 35.
218. Herbert M. Lefcourt, Locus of Control: Current Trends in Theory and Research
at 15 (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1976).
219. Lefcourt, Locus of Control at 15.
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This description applies in the modern era, as much as it did to
the slaves. In 1962, a black man wrote a letter to the editor of
Harper's Magazine drawing an analogy between the black man in
America and enlisted men in the army:
Surely no other life open to the American White so closely resembles the
Negro's- the world of Them and Us. They with their money, and handsome
uniforms, knowledge, organization, and (0 God) their power. We with our
anonymity ("D'ja ever notice how all [enlisted men] look alike?") dirt, en-
couraged stupidity, and uselessness. In such .a world, only one weapon is
available, but it is mighty: The Resolve to Live Up to Our Reputation. We
are clods? dolts? animals? Very well. We shall be the cloddiest, most doltish
animals on earth. . . . The man who is born an [enlisted man] cannot be
rehabilitated. He needs metamorphosis and unlike the fellow in Kafka, he
can't do it overnight.
220
As evidenced by this letter, a perceived lack of control over one's
life and its major events combine to cause a feeling of helplessness
by some African-Americans.22 1 This perception could be the source
of an entire symptomology. "If one feels helpless to affect impor-
tant events, then resignation or at least benign indifference should
become evident, with fewer signs of concern, involvement, and
vitality.
'222
The impact of racial discrimination may be exacerbated by asso-
ciated economic and political oppression. In the African-American
experience, a wide variety of oppression existed. Each type of op-
pression constituted a formidable obstacle to voting rights equal-
ity: ". . . [t]he mental health of Blacks is inextricably tied to the
overall economic, political, and social status of Black people. Sim-
ply stated: unless there is a substantial reduction in the political
and economically based oppression, there will not be an overall im-
provement in mental health."22
While judicial protection of African-American voting rights may
provide a theoretical equality, true equality is enmeshed with a
psychological perception of that equality. As author Frank Parker
220. Id at 22, 24 citing Douglas Scott, The Negro and the Enlisted Man in The Negro
as First Class Citizen: Some Comments and Rejoinders, Harper's Magazine 16, 16-21
(1962).
221. Fatalism, accompanied by apathy and withdrawal, might very well have perme-
ated the Black American experience to the extent that such an attitude interfered with the
community's goals. Lefcourt, Locus of Control at 184 (cited in note 218). Lefcourt states
"[w]here fatalism or external control beliefs are associated with apathy and withdrawal, the
holding of internal control expectancies presages a connection between an individual's
desires and his subsequent actions." Id.
222. Id.




This does not mean that voting rights litigation actually got Black candi-
dates elected, only that it was a necessary precondition to Black political
success. The normal rules governing political- mobilization and political suc-
cess still applied: the Black community still had to recruit candidates to run
who would appeal to a broad spectrum of the voting public, and these can-
didates still had to adopt platforms that would appeal to voters, campaign
for votes, and win a majority of the votes to be elected to office.
224
The failure to exercise the right to vote may occur for many dif-
ferent reasons. The psychological harm caused by years of sus-
tained discrimination is but one impediment. This observation is
not intuitively obvious. To some, if a group is aware of the power it
has, the group will exercise that power. Historian Steven F. Law-
son, in his book Black Ballots, attributed African-American voting
apathy to a failure of volition: "[w]ith the overt legal barriers de-
stroyed, lack of political consciousness remained a major obstacle
on the road toward enfranchisement." 2  Yet Lawson later reevalu-
ated his position, writing:
[Wihile most southern jurisdictions comply with the letter of the 1965 law,
many attempted to violate its spirit by grafting sophisticated forms of bias
onto existing electoral institutions. Unless the underlying structural imped-
iments blocking the franchise are removed, the considerable, but as yet lim-
ited, amount of success southern Blacks have enjoyed in pursuit of political
power will not go much further 2"
Ironically, the backlash against affirmative action generally has created a
similar but smaller scale movement against singling out minorities in the
voting rights context. Political scientist Abigail Thernstrom comments that
the use of litigation to enforce the one person-one vote principle com-
menced "the process by which the Voting Rights Act was reshaped into an
instrument for affirmative action in the electoral sphere."2 7 In this view,
attempts to ensure voting equality through various statutes are being
viewed as favoritism, not remedial assistance.2 8 Consequently, exercising
the franchise, long considered a symbol of equality in the eyes of some, por-
trays a tarnished symbol of unjustified preference.
2 9
Despite such characterizations, it seems clear that the psychological ana-
logue to "learned helplessness" has had a considerable adverse impact on
224. Frank R. Parker, Black Votes Count: Political Empowerment in Mississippi Af-
ter 1965 at 10 (University of North Carolina Press, 1990).
225. Parker, Black Votes Count at 7 citing Steven R. Lawson, Black Ballots: Voting
Rights in the South, 1944-1969 at 330 (Columbia University Press, 1976).
226. Parker, Black Votes Count at 8 citing Steven R. Lawson, In Pursuit of Power:
Southern Blacks and Electoral Politics, 1965-1982 at xii (Columbia University Press, 1985).
227. Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count? at 27 (cited in note 163).




the African-American community's failure to effectively exercise the right to
vote. The next chapter explores the options available to ameliorate or rec-
tify such harm
2 30
V. MINIMIZING VOTING RIGHTS DISCRIMINATION IN THE 1990's
Voting rights discrimination and the psychological harm sus-
tained by discrimination persist. The pertinent question is whether
a feasible remedy can be fashioned. In light of the historical frame-
work, there is no ready, confident response. It appears unrealistic
to believe that discrimination can be overcome solely through the
adoption of any particular legal, social, economic, or other counter-
measure. Such discrimination is too entrenched, subtle, and perni-
cious to be easily or quickly negated. Further, the resources re-
quired to impede future discrimination and its effects are unlikely
to be allocated for psychological harms such as learned
helplessness.
2 31
Yet, the improbability of success should not prevent the formal-
ized consideration and implementation of multi-faceted, multi-dis-
ciplinary voting rights safeguards. The mere existance of an oppo-
sition to further discriminatory harm predicates hope and faith in
change, two important preconditions to substantive improvement.
The following suggestions are presented as a dualistic approach,
separately focusing on those who are discriminated against, and
those who manipulate the rule of law in order to discriminate.232
230. Two commentators have noted:
According to the original theory of learned helplessness, when an organism is exposed
to an uncontrollable situation it learns that outcomes are independent of its re-
sponses (i.e., are uncontrollable) and forms an expectation that future outcomes also
will be response independent. This expectation interferes with the learning of new
contingencies and undermines the motivation to initiate activity, resulting in per-
formance (cognitive and motivational) and affective deficits. Hence the theory as-
cribes helplessness symptoms to the generalization of uncontrollability from helpless-
ness training (i.e., exposure to noncontingency) to subsequent activity. Thus, in this
theoretical framework, the critical antecedent of helplessness deficits is exposure to a
series of outcomes (positive or negative) that are noncontingently related to behavior.
Grzegorz Sedek and Miroslaw Kofta, When Cognitive Exertion Does Not Yield Cognitive
Gain: Toward an Informational Explanation of Learned Helplessness, 58 J Personality &
Soc Psych 729 (1990).
231. In essence, the most that can be done might be to recognize that voting rights
discrimination remains a problem in the 1990's, and that part of the problem is extra-legal,
extending to cultural, economic, social, and psychological dimensions, particularly to a
chronic learned helplessness.
232. Where the discriminated against were sufficiently powerless that the mere resto-
ration of legal rights would not be enough for an effective enjoyment of those rights.
1993
Duquesne Law Review
A. The Discriminated Against
Even when granted the right to vote, it appears as if African-
Americans do not exercise that right. To overcome white hegemony
and both voluntary and involuntary disenfranchisement, the psy-
chological harm sustained from years of voting rights impoverish-
ment must first be addressed.
Efforts to overcome the psychological disaffection 23 3 resulting
from voting rights deprivation can take several forms. These in-
clude an increased flow of information about the political process,
general education, enhanced socio-economic status, an increased
awareness of African-American history, an improved understand-
ing of psychological deprivation, and the encouragement of inspira-
tional leaders.
Perhaps the most important countermeasure that can be taken
by the voting minority is the instillation of the belief that the mi-
nority vote counts. It is this empowerment, rather than simply
climbing back to a "paper equality," that provides the greatest in-
centive for African-Americans to utilize the franchise.234 Arguably,
an increase in voter turnout among Black Americans alone can
have a positive affect on the community. That is, an increased feel-
ing of community cohesiveness may arise from increased voter
turnout, and vice versa.23' Noted one commentator:
By acting together in the political sphere, a group of apparently disparate
individuals may come to appreciate the strength of their common interests,
and those already so connected may recognize the power that comes from
concerted effort. These benefits may be of particular value to members of
minority groups, for whom discrimination has often thwarted control over
their own destinies and a capacity to act collectively.
2 3s
233. The elimination of White hegemony and the accompanying receipt of voting
equality will not likely suffice to eradicate the psychological and sociological effects of over
two hundred years of voting rights discrimination. The psychological scars of voting rights
discrimination will likely require psychological as well as actual mobilization of African-
Americans before their votes can be effectively restored and exercised.
234. Parker, Black Votes Count at 10 (cited in note 224).
235. Kathryn Abrams, "Raising Politics Up:" Minority Political Participation and
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 63 NYU L Rev 449, 477 (1988).
236. Abrams, 63 NYU L Rev at 477. "The constitutive or community-reinforcing ra-
tionale is also insufficient if considered in isolation. Most people undertake collective action,
not simply as a means of self-definition, but because they expect some substantive good to
come of it." Id at 477 n 180.
Yet this same commentator notes that perceived failures over time build up to discourage
further action:
If collective efforts fail, over time, to yield the desired change, participants are more
likely to be discouraged than elevated by their efforts. Many political observers argue,
for example, that the failure of Blacks in New York City to win major policy initia-
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Furthermore, African-Americans who believe that voting can en-
hance their "social and economic status"2 ' can rely on voting as a
means to a non-political end. Such an instrumental conception of
the power of voting may serve as an important tool to persuade
iidividuals'to vote.
Perhaps the most pragmatic method of overcoming psychological
harms is through the use of inspirational leaders. Individuals of
varied political beliefs such as Jesse Jackson, Louis Farakhan, and
Douglas Wilder can mobilize and incite action on the part of those
people who respect them. Even inspirational leaders like Michael
Jordan, Magic Johnson, and Bo Jackson can achieve a following,
merely by setting an example. In a book about Mary McLeod Be-
thune and James Weldon Johnson, the dedication reads: "This se-
ries is dedicated to the Black youth who will be inspired to follow
in the footsteps of those intrepid black leaders who achieved emi-
nence in spite of almost unsurmountable odds." ' 8
Inspirational individuals can have a disproportionate impact on
the utilization of voting rights by African-Americans. This may be
particularly true if the leader is perceived to have earned achieve-
ments on his or her own, overcoming obstacles along the way. Fan-
nie Lou Hamer, who fought for voting rights in Mississippi, has
stated:
I've worked on voter registration here ever since I went to that first mass
meeting. . . . We formed our own party because the Whites wouldn't even
let us register .... We followed all the laws the White people themselves
made. We tried to attend the precinct meetings and they locked the doors
on us or moved the meetings and that's against the law they made for their
own selves .. . But we learned the hard way that even though we had all
the law and all the righteousness on our side, that White man is not going
to give up this power to us. . . . The question for black people is not, when
is the White man going to give us our rights, or when is he going to give us
good education for our children, or when is he going to give us jobs-if the
White man gives you anything-just remember when he gets ready he will
take it right back. We have to take for ourselves.22 9
tives or elect a Black candidate to major office has resulted in low morale and divisive
in-fighting among black leaders and voters.
Id. See also, Howard W. French and Nick Ravo, Blacks and Political Power: the Key to
Easing Tensions, NY Times B1 (April 2, 1987); Michael Oreskes, Blacks in New York: The
Anguish of Political Failure, NY Times Bi (March 31, 1987).
237. Milton D, Morris, Black Electoral Participation and the Distribution of Public
Benefits, in Chandler Davidson, ed, Minority Vote Dilution at 271 (Howard University
Press, 1984).
238. Ida R. Bellegarde, Black Heroes and Heroines: Book I (Harlo Printing Co, 1979).
239. Juan Williams, Eyes on the Prize: America's Civil Rights Years 1954-1965 at
246-247 (1986) citing Fannie Lou Hamer, To Praise Our Bridges: An Autobiography
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B. The Discriminators
To effectively minimize continued voting rights discrimination, a
vigorous and aggressive legal response must be maintained. Mea-
sures include additional legislation intended to ensure equality in
the right to vote, and laws promoting corollary rights involving
such matters as redistricting. Close scrutiny should be given by the
courts to governmental actions that may dilute the one-person-
one-vote principle. Yet, there is no reason to believe that legal
measures in the future will have any greater success than in the
past.
In addition to laws prohibiting discrimination, a multi-discipli-
nary approach similar to that suggested for those subjected to dis-
crimination should be adopted to effectively limit the discrimina-
tors. This means that as part of the legal response, economic,
psychological, and even irrational factors must be considered in the
calculus of disenfranchisement.24 °
(Kipco, 1967).
240. The legal response can and should come from state legislatures and Congress, as
well as the courts. State legislatures can take preventive measures not available to the
courts. The courts, on the other hand, have broad powers to enforce the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, and are not subject to the whims of the electorate.
Unless the courts enforce the rights allocated, such legislative or constitutional rights will
mean very little. Thus, zealous enforcement of such rights must occur before the desired
results will occur. In essence, enforcement will have a bootstrapping effect, with more spe-
cific legislation generating more specific - and consequently enhanced - enforcement by the
courts.
Interestingly, the United States Supreme Court, despite its decidedly conservative make-
up in the 1990's, has not negated voting rights advancements for the African-American. In
two of the more recent voting rights cases, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to make
advancements. In Houston Lawyers Association v Attorney General of Texas, 111 S Ct
2376 (1991), the Court held that section two of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 applies to the
election of state trial judges. In Chisom v Roemer, 111 S Ct 2354 (1991), the Court held that
section two of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 also applies to the election of state supreme
court justices. In these six-three decisions, the Court appeared to embrace the activism of an
earlier era. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, interpreted the word "representatives" in
the Act to include judges. Chisom, 111 S Ct at 2366. Justice Stevens reasoned that: "If
executive officers such as prosecutors, sheriffs, state attorneys general, and state treasurers,
can be considered 'representatives' simply because they are chosen by popular election, then
the same reasoning should apply to elected judges." Id. Furthermore, in Clark v. Roemer,
111 S Ct 2096 (1991), the Court unanimously held that a federal court must enjoin state
judge elections if the United States Attorney General objects utilizing a valid basis under
section five of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, found
that the Louisiana elections at issue did not receive tacit approval by the United States
Attorney General as a result of the Attorney General's approval of other, related changes in
Louisiana's electoral process. Clark, 111 S Ct at 2104. These cases, in the aggregate, suggest
that the United States Supreme Court is paying at least modest, if not vigilant, attention to
the voting rights area.
The trend in the Supreme Court cases, however, is not encouraging overall. In fact, more
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This expansive approach includes persuading potential discrimi-
nators that increased minority voting will actually serve the major-
ity's own interests as well.24' As Blacks enter the middle and upper
classes in increasing number and become more conservative, inter-
est-oriented politicians may see the Black vote as a source of sup-.
port and not as an entity to be feared.2" 2 An example of such an
individual is Justice Clarence Thomas, who is proving to be a
staunch conservative.2"*
Similarly, advocates can point out that an increase in the minor-
ity voting rights has rarely threatened the White ruling politi-
cians.24' "In no state legislature and in only a few of the most
heavily Black counties and cities have blacks gained a majority of
the legislative seats. In most instances the creation of single-mem-
ber districts or the elimination of gerrymander districts has pro-
duced not black control, but power-sharing among White and
Black legislators. '245 Ironically, White politicians who object to in-
creased voting rights for African-Americans as reverse discrimina-
tion, or as an "affirmative action" of voting rights, may be the least
sympathetic of individuals to advance such a claim.2 4
Another expansive consideration that may ameliorate discrimi-
nation is economics. Studies have shown that as economic dispari-
ties between the incomes of Whites and Blacks decrease, the com-
petition between White and Black members of the. same social
class decreases.2 4 Consequently, there will be less aversion to
granting Blacks the right to vote. For example, in the South during
the first third of the twentieth century, advances in Black suffrage
appeared as a complement to "increased educational facilities, de-
creasing economic competition as new and more jobs became avail-
able, and a higher standard of living. "248
and more courts are adopting the Reconstruction Era's laissez-faire attitudes toward voting
rights. History teaches that this maintenance of the status quo simply results in greater
resistance.
241. With the changing face of politics in the 1990's, the Black vote may be perceived
by some politicians as best limited by co-option.
242. Lewinson, Race, Class and Party at 216-21 (cited in note 4).
243. See, for example, Justice Thomas' dissent in a recent case involving prisoners'
rights, Hudson v McMillan, 112 S Ct 995, 1004 (1992). In his first 44 cases, Justice Thomas
essentially agreed with Justice Antonio Scalia, one of the most conservative members of the
court.
244. Parker, Black Votes Count at 209 (cited in note 224).
245. Id.
246. "No individual officeholder has an entitlement to elective office." Id.




Unfortunately, the economic outlook in the 1990's does not favor
these conditions. The gap between the rich and poor is growing.
249
The trend towards a two-tiered society,5 0 where many of the
Blacks share lower class status with Whites and are in competition
with each other for a diminishing number of jobs, suggests that the
situation is ripe for continued voting discrimination. In essence,
the master-servant mentality is more likely to resurface in a con-
ducive environment, which is ironically occurring more and more
in urban areas. Columbia University economist Saskia Sassen-
Koob has stated:
The growth of the new urban upper middle class stimulates the prolifera-
tion of low-wage jobs. We're seeing the growth in the cities of a kind of
"servant" that prepares a gourmet plate of food for the wealthy, such as
their designer clothes, and helps manufacture their customized furniture.
6 1
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to equal voting rights, however,
cuts across political, social, and economic concerns and lies in the
irrational. This is the spectre of "Negro domination." '252 According
to this line of thought, increased voting rights upsets a perceived
"Negro balance of power."2 53 It is this image of a gain of power by
the Black minority that has been used historically to fuel the dis-
enfranchisement movement.2 5 Thus, it appears that this particular
obstacle creates a Catch-22: as Black suffrage increases, the spectre
of Black domination and an upset of the "balance of power" also
increases.
Given these obstacles, it is more important to convince rather
than coerce those groups or individuals who may be opposed to a
pluralist view of voting rights that the exercise of voting rights
does not pose a real threat. According to one commentator:
First, those who do not share minority interests may acknowledge the con-
tribution of racial diversity to the political process. . . . Second, non-minor-
ity participants may favor enhanced minority participation because of con-
cern for the legitimacy of the governmental system. . . . A system attains
one kind of legitimacy by following whatever rules are set down, but this
formal legitimacy must be supplemented by a substantive component. Sub-
stantive legitimacy requires that the features of the political system, and
249. Ehren Reich, The Worst Years of Our Lives: Irrevent Notes from a Decade of
Greed at 197 (Harper Perennial, 1990) citing Congress Joint Economic Committee Report.
250. Reich, The Worst Years of Our Lives at 197.
251. Id at 204.
252. Lewinson, Race, Class and Party at 199 (cited in note 4).
253. Id.




the government that arises from it, appear to be consistent with the com-
monly held premises concerning human nature and the need for a political
society that underlie the system. 5
Thus, while responding to discrimination with additional laws
deter somewhat the discriminators from their attempts to disen-
franchise African-Americans in increasingly subtle and clever ways,
such efforts may have little substantive impact. Instead, to be
more effective, it is imperative to persuade the discriminators that
it is actually in their own interests to stop discriminating.
VI. CONCLUSION
Have the Fifteenth Amendment and various Voting Rights Acts
succeeded in obliterating voting rights discrimination? The answer
remains an emphatic "no".2 56 Legislatures and other government
bodies have not stopped enacting or considering plans that under-
mine the "one person, one vote" principle, the backbone of voting
rights in this country. 257 In response, the courts are confronting
new and invidious forms of voting rights dilution, and are engaged
in an evolving enforcement of the Voting Rights 'Act of 1965.
Consequently, the Fifteenth Amendment still waits for vindica-
tion. Its unfulfilled potential has exacted a signficant price. More
than two centuries of voting rights discrimination has taken its toll
on the psyche and hopes of African-Americans. As the promise of
the Fifteenth Amendment remains unfulfilled, the prospect of
utilizing the law to actually engage in the right to vote appears to
255. Abrams, 63 NYU L Rev at 478-79 (cited in note 235). Professor Abrams argues
that section two of the Voting Rights Act can provide much more than merely additional
representation for minorities, and that the benefits accrue to non-minorities as well as those
minorities directly affected. Id.
256. Voting right equality is still being sought in many jurisdictions. Dade County at-
large elections were recently challenged in Meek v Metropolitan Dade County, 908 F2d
1540 (11th Cir 1990) (reversing the lower court) after applying the three-part test of Thorn-
burg v Gingles, 106 S Ct 2752 (1986). The Gingles standard requires: (1) demonstrate that
the minority group is sufficiently large; (2) show that the group is politically cohesive; and
(3) show the White majority votes as a bloc to regularly defeat the minority interests. Gin-
gles, 478 US at 50-51. But the law is not always moving in the direction of equality. See, for
example, City of Lockhart v United States, 460 US 125 (1983). There the Court confirmed
the retrograde standard developed in Beer v United States, 425 US 130 (1976). The Court
held that regarding redistricting and electoral changes, the intent behind section five of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 was to preserve the status quo of political representation, even
where voting discrimination continues to exist. See also, City of Mobile v Bolden, 446 US
55, 71 (1980). In Bolden, the court concluded that at-large voting in Mobile city elections
did not unconstitutionally dilute the votes of the Black minority, by undermining the one
person, one vote standard of Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533, 542 (1964).
257. Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533 (1964).
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dim with each passing day.
In all likelihood, voting rights discrimination will persist in the
1990's and beyond. Current laws are still being circumvented. No
easy methods exist by which to overcome the learned helplessness
associated with the exercise of voting rights.
Yet, despite the lack of easily implemented countermeasures,
some proposals warrant consideration. The discriminators may be
deterred through the vigilant enforcement of existing laws, and
may be persuaded that the equality of voting rights supports the
discriminators' own political interests overall. Furthermore, inspi-
rational leaders and other factors such as an improved socio-eco-
nomic status may diminish tendencies toward learned
helplessness.258
The factor most likely to have an immediate and profound effect
upon the psyche of the discriminated is the influence exerted by
inspirational leaders. Leaders can provide the motivation and the
education necessary to overcome feelings of helplessness and hope-
lessness. In this way, the effective enjoyment of the right to vote,
considered so important to the preservation of our democratic sys-
tem, can be realized by all.
258. Despite effective equality, effective enjoyment of voting rights will not occur un-
less the psychological deprivation of learned helplessness is overcome. This can occur
through an increased awareness about the significance of voting, changes in socio-economic
status and in community cohesiveness, among other factors.
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